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the parties as to the matters they believed sncuid oe covered by
the post-hearing briefs.

During the hearing^ j^ocli parties were
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given full opportunity to call all witnesses they desired and 84
exhibits were introduced by Worthington & Kimball and 59 by the
respondents.

Both parties were given opportunity to file and did

file post-hearing and reply briefs.
Under date of August 30, 198 3 Worthington & Kimball
moved to reopen the hearing to determine the respective rights and
liabilities of C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and
C & A Companies, Inc. under any award made in these proceedings in
light of an assignment of the original contract by C & A Development
to C & A Enterprises in March, 1981. Under date of September 29,
1983 the American Arbitration Association notified the parties that
the arbitrators had agreed to reopen the hearings.

Under date of

October 18, 1983 the parties were advised the reopened hearing
would be held on October 24, 1983, limited to evidence and argument
as to whether any award can or should be made for or against any
party other than the parties to the original contract, i.e., C & A
Development Company as owner and Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company as contractor, and as to the allocation of costs and fees.
Because of the inability of counsel for respondents to
appear, the hearing scheduled for October 24, 19 83 was not held.
By means of a conference telephone call, the parties stipulated
that in March, 1981 the contract between Worthington & Kimball and
C & A Development Company was assigned by C & A Development to
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies
is a general partner.

The parties further agreed that respondents

should have until and including October 28, 1983 to respond in
writing to the merits of the contentions of Worthington & Kimball
set forth in their motion to reopen the hearing.

The arbitrators, therefore, vacated the hearing set for
October 24, 1983 and granted Worthington & Kimball until November 4,
1983 to respond to any arguments presented by respondents as to
the effect of the assignment on the rights and liabilities of
C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and C & A Companies
in the matter before the arbitrators.

The arbitrators further

directed that the memoranda to be filed by each party should also
state the position of such party as to the assessment of costs and
fees in this proceeding.
After receipt of said briefs the arbitrators met on
November 7, 19 83 and, based on the evidence heard, the exhibits
introduced, the briefs of counsel and the visit to and inspection
of the construction site, make the following Findings:
1.

On or about July 2, 1980 Worthington & Kimball and

C & A Development Company entered into a contract on AGC Form No.
6a "Design - Build Agreement between Owner and Contractor."

The

only significant amendment to that form made by the parties was in
paragraph 2.5.2, to which was added the following language:
Any and all test borings, soil sampling and pre-determined
construction surveys and investigations (other than site
survey) shall be done by contractor, if contractor fails
or neglects to obtain such borings, testings, etc.,
contractor shall assume all liability for any failures in
the building as a result of any deficiency that may
result therefrom.
2.

We construe that language to mean that the parties

intended that if (a) the contractor employed a competent person
to conduct such borings, testings, etc., (b) fully informed that
person of the general nature of the planned construction, (c) the
borings, testings, etc., were performed and the report thereof
was made in accordance with standards of the industry, (d) the

plans and specifications provided by the contractor under paragraph
2.1 complied with the findings and recommendations of the person
employed to make such borings, testings, etc., and (e) the contractor
followed such plans and specifications in the construction of the
building, the contractor is relieved of any liability for any
failures or defects in the building resulting from soil conditions,
differential settlement and the like.
3.

In March, 1981, with the consent of Worthington &

Kimball, the original contract between Worthington & Kimball and
C & A Development was assigned by C & A Development to C & A
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies, Inc.
is a general partner.

In addition, the property on which the

building was constructed was deeded by C & A Development to C & A
Enterprises.

By reason thereof, references in this award to "owner"

shall be deemed to include both C & A Enterprises and C & A
Development, jointly and severally.

We believe any allocation of

payment of the award is to be determined by agreement between them,
without necessity of any ruling by the arbitrators.

The obligation

of C & A Companies, Inc. under the award is only as a general
partner of C & A Enterprises and is determined by the provisions
of Section 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated.
4.

The unpaid balance of the contract price, as adjusted

by change orders as provided in Article 9 of the Contract, to which
Worthington & Kimball is entitled to be paid as provided in Article
11 of the contract, is $430,053.00, subject to such deductions
therefrom as the arbitrators find to be warranted under the terms
of the contract and the evidence received with respect to the claims
of the owner.

A rt

5.

The owner is entitled to a reduction of the said

unpaid balance in the sum of $52,922.00, allocated as follows:
a.

Repairs to asphalt in parking lots and drives,
$25,125.00;

b.

Punch list items - this includes correction of
cantilever area of roof over dock, $10,000.00;

c.

Repair of external walls due to separation and
spalling, $2,500.00; and

d.

Credit for payments by C & A to Worthington &
Kimball, subcontractors, $15,297.00.

6.

All other claims of the owner have been carefully and

fully considered, but are denied on one or more of the following
grounds:
a.

Not the responsibility of the contractor;

b.

Not supported by the evidence;

c.

Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the
contract between the parties, including the plans
and specifications;

d.

Not quantified by reliable evidence;

e.

Not included within the scope of the work to be
performed by the contractor;

f.

Barred by acts or failure to act of the owner; and

g.

Abandonment of the claim during hearings or in
briefs.

7.

The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate of

15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until
paid by owner.

We select that rate in part as a measure of damages
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to Worthington & Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the
balance of the contract price.
8. All other claims of the contractor have been fully
and carefully considered, but are denied on one or more of the
following grounds:
a. Not the responsibility of the owner;
b.

Not supported by the evidence;

c.

Not authorized by the contract or barred by the
terms of the contract, including the plans and
specifications;

d.

Already covered in change orders executed by owner
and contractor;

e.

Not quantified by reliable evidence;

f.

Are otherwise contained in the award herein made;

g.

Barred by acts or failure to act of the contractor;
and

h.

Abandonment of claim during hearings or in briefs.

9.

Owner shall pay to contractor the sum of $377,131.00

plus interest as provided in paragraph 7 above upon the contractor
filing with the office of the American Arbitration Association in
Denver, Colorado lien waivers from the contractor and all its
subcontractors.

This requirement does not include Robert E. Lee

doing business as Ogden Industrial Plastic, who we find is not a
subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball.
10.

Administrative fees and arbitrators' fees and

expenses as determined by the American Arbitration Association office
in Denver, Colorado shall be borne 75.0% by owner and 25.0% by

-6M
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Worthington & Kimball. All other expenses shall be allocated as
follows:
a.

The expenses of witnesses for either side shall
be paid by the party producing such witness
including witnesses produced in response to the
arbitrators' letter to counsel dated May 27, 19 83;

b.

Cost of the stenographic record, equally between
owner and Worthington & Kimball, unless they shall
have otherwise agreed prior to the receipt of this
award;

c.

All other expenses of the arbitration, as described
generally in paragraph 50 of the Construction
Industry Arbitration rules, shall be born equally
by the parties; and

d.

The nature and amount of such expenses shall be
determined by the Denver office of the American
Arbitration Association.

DATED this 1 tj

day of November, 1983.

^o.• V

P e t e r W. B i l l i n g s , 7 C h a i r m a n

George^y.

n

B. Lue B e t t i l ^ y e r r

0 4 3^2?
Robert F. Bentley, Esq.
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
(602) 947-7775
Attorney for C & A Development Co.
and C & A Enterprises
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership,
et al,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, et al,
Defendants.

V
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO CONFIRM AWARD
AND MOTION TO VACATE AWARD
Civil No. 83387

)

Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A
ENTERPRISES, by and through their attorney, ROBERT F. BENTLEY, hereby
oppose Plaintiff1s Motion to Confirm Award and move this Court
pursuant to Section 78-31-16, Utah Code Annotated, to vacate the
award of the American Arbitration Association, on the grounds that:
(A) The arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an
award after the time within which the award was to be made had
expired, by reopening the hearing at a time which would prevent the
making of the award within the time agreed upon by the parties
without agreement of the parties to extension of the time, and by
making an award upon matters not submitted to them and not within the
terms of the agreement.

(B) The arbitrators after the close of the hearing received
additional evidence in support of Plaintiff's claims but refused to
receive additional evidence from Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES, in support of their claims as
Respondents in said arbitration.
(C) There was evident partiality of /the arbitrators as
evidenced by the irregularities in procedure and the award.
(D) The award was procured by fraud or other undue means.
This motion is supported by the attached Memorandum.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983.

Robert F. Bentley
7525 East Camelback *Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
Attorney for C & A Development
Co. and C & A Enterprises
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONFIRM
AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE
Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A
ENTERPRISES, have opposed Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award and
have moved this Court to vacate the award made by the American
Arbitration Association in the matter entitled WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, Claimant, vs. C & A
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES, an
Arizona partnership, and C & A COMPANIES, INC., an Arizona
corporation, a copy of which Award is attached to Plaintiff's Motion
to Confirm Award.

The award must be vacated as the arbitrators

exceeded their powers, were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, there was evident
partiality in the arbitrators and the award was procured by fraud or
other undue means.
I.

The arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an

award after the time specified had expired.

The parties agreed by

contract that the rules of the American Arbitration Association would
apply.

With respect to time for award, the rules provide:

"The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or specified by law,
not later than thirty (30) days from the date of closing of
the hearings . . . . "
Rule 41, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". As no other time was agreed upon by
the parties and the law (U.C.A. §78-31-8) specifies that the award
must be made within sixty (60) days from the time of the appointment
of the arbitrators, if the time is not fixed in the arbitration
agreement, the time within which the award must be made is thirty
(30) days from the date of closing the hearings. The hearings were
- 3 -

closed on September 2, 1983. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto. Thus,
the award must have been made on or before October 2nd in order to be
within the time as specified by the parties.
The arbitration rules specify that if no other specific
time is set forth in the contract and the hearings are reopened, the
award must be made within thirty (30) days from closing of the
reopened hearings.
See Exhibit "A".

Rule 36, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules.

However, the rule also provides that:

"If the reopening of the hearing would prevent the making of
the award within the specific time agreed upon by the
parties in the contract out of which the controversy has
arisen, the matter may not be reopened, unless the parties
agree upon the extension of such time limit."
Notwithstanding this limitation, the hearing was reopened
over the objection of Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A
ENTERPRISES, and without their consent to extension of the time
limit.

In fact, they specifically objected to any reopening of the

hearing which would permit Plaintiff to submit additional evidence
with respect to their claims which should have been but was not
submitted in prior hearings without also permitting C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to submit additional evidence with
respect to their defenses and claims which they had not presented
because the arbitrators directed that the surrebuttal case be limited
to two (2) days.

See Exhibits "C" (Plaintiffs1 Motion for Reopening

of Hearing), "D" (the Response thereto), "E" (the American
Arbitration Association letter advising that the hearing had been
reopened), "F" (the panel's Notice of Hearing) and "G" (letter from
- 4 -

the attorney for C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES
objecting thereto).
Inasmuch as reopening of the hearing did not extend the
time within which the award was to be made, the arbitrators had no
power to make an award after October 2, 1983, and the award made must
be vacated.
The arbitrators also exceeded their powers by making an
award which was not within the contract.
provide that:

The arbitration rules

!,

the arbitrator may grant any relief or remedy which

is just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the
parties" Rule 43, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, see
Exhibit MAT! (emphasis added).The arbitrators fixed interest at
fifteen percent (15%) per annum "in part as a measure of damages . .
for the unreasonable withholding of the balance of the contract
price".

See Award, pages 5-6.

Neither the contract nor any other

agreement of the parties provided for damages intended to be punitive
in nature such as these.

The contract specified the rate of interest

which payments due but unpaid should bear.

Section 11.1.4, page 8.

Both parties submitted evidence as to the appropriate rate (Plaintiff
claimed that prime plus two was the appropriate rate while Defendants
submitted evidence that after December 1, 1981, the construction loan
rate was at seventy-five percent of prime or less than the legal rate
of ten percent).

- 5 -

In rejecting the evidence submitted by all parties as to
the appropriate interest and arbitrarily choosing a rate of fifteen
percent in part to punish C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A
ENTERPRISES for being unreasonable, the arbitrators exceeded their
powers.

(That such interest was intended as a penalty is further

evidenced by the panel's letter of July 14, 1933 [prior to the
surrebuttal case of C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES]
which specifically requested argument as to what "penalty" should be
assessed against C & A if it withheld an unreasonable amount from the
final request for payment.

Items 4 (A) and (B), page 2, Exhibit

"H" . )
Because the arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an
award which was not "within the agreement of the parties", the award
must be vacated.
In addition, should it be determined that the award is not
defective as a result of the failure to make an award within the
time agreed by the parties, the panel exceeded their powers by
making an award against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY despite the fact
that Plaintiff had withdrawn any claim against C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY in the Reply of Worthington & Kimball regarding the
respective liability of the C & A entities (C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, C & A ENTERPRISES and C & A COMPANIES, INC.)-

Plaintiff

stated, "Because of the individual liability of the general partners
of C & A Enterprises, W&K (Worthington & Kimball.) will not pursue the
- 6 -

secondary liability of C & A DEVELOPMENT".

Exhibit "I", page 2.

Thus, Plaintiffs withdrew from the arbitrators1 consideration any
claim against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY based upon its secondary
liability.

Despite the withdrawal of this claim, the arbitrators

made an award against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY jointly and severally
with C & A ENTERPRISES.

In so doing, they exceeded their powers by

making an award upon a matter not submitted to them.

As a result,

the award must be vacated.
II.

In addition to exceeding their powers, the arbitrators

were guilty of misconduct in refusing to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to supplement their surrebuttal case,
and the award must be vacated.
As has been discussed above, the surrebuttal case was
limited to two days at the arbitrators' direction.

In an effort to

complete the hearing as directed, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY limited
the number of witnesses and the areas of evidence on surrebuttal.
When Plaintiff moved to reopen the hearing to submit additional
evidence because it had failed to substantiate a claim against any
Respondent other than C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, C <Sc A ENTERPRISES
and C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY requested that if the hearings be
reopened, they be permitted to supplement their surrebuttal case.
Plaintiff in its Motion to reopen the hearing argued facts
which were not in evidence from the hearings.

By so doing, the

Plaintiff attempted to ensure that even if the hearings were not
- 7 -

reopened, the evidence which they desired to present would be before
the panel.

Plaintiff*s actions in this respect were clearly

improper.
In receiving additional proofs from Plaintiff but refusing
to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to
supplement their surrebuttal case, the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct and the award must be vacated.
III.

The award must be vacated because of evident

partiality of the arbitrators.

That partiality is evidenced by the

penalty interest assessed in the award, by making C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY jointly and severally liable with C & A ENTERPRISES in the
award despite the withdrawal of claims against C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY by Plaintiffs, and by reopening hearings to permit Plaintiff
to supplement its case but refusal to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to supplement theirs, all as discussed
above.
In addition, partiality is evident from the discussion in
the Award regarding the modification to the contract regarding the
soil testing.

The panel indicates five items which if followed by

the contractor, relieved the contractor of liability for failures or
defects in the building resulting from soil conditions, differential
settlement and the like.

Of the five set forth, it was clear from

the evidence submitted that at least two were not fulfilled by the
contractor.

The contractor did not fully inform the person
- 8 -

conducting soil tests of the general nature of the planned
construction.

Mr. Rollins who performed the soils test, testified

that he did not know what type of building was going to be
constucted.

See Exhibit "J", an excerpt of the testimony of Ralph

Rollins, p. 1980, lines 17-20.

In addition, the plans and

specifications provided by the contractor did not comply with the
findings and recommendations of the person employed to make such
borings.

Plaintiff did not dispute that its architect failed to

proportion the footings as recommended by the soils report.

In fact,

in their brief they stated that an engineering decision was made not
to follow that recommendation.

Clearly, Plaintiff is not relieved

from liability for engineering decisions to deviate from the
recommendations of the soils expert.

Despite failure to conform to

two of the five requirements set forth by the arbitrators, , the
arbitrators failed to make any award for damages due to differential
settlement despite clear evidence that differential settlement has
occurred and caused damage to the building.
Due to the evident partiality of the arbitrators, the award
must be vacated.
IV.

The award must be vacated as it was procured by fraud

or other undue means.

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A

ENTERPRISES claimed in the arbitration proceedings that a credit for
items which were included in the contract at the time it was signed,
were not provided by Plaintiff and yet were included in the contract
- 9 -

price.

However, the items were shown on the contract plans which

were initialed by the parties.

Plaintiff claimed that the deletions

occurred prior to execution of the contract and were reflected by a
reduction in the price.

Despite the clear requirements of the

contract plans, Plaintiff claimed that an unsigned set of redlined
plans were the contract drawings though none of the personnel of
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY who testified had ever seen them prior to
the arbitration hearing.

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A

ENTEPRISES are preparing a discovery request which will include
documents in the hands of Plaintiff which they believe will
demonstrate that the initialed plans were in fact those which defined
the contract and that the contract price includes those items which
Plaintiff claims were deleted from the contract and price prior to
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES believe

execution.

that with those documents, they can demonstrate that the award was
procured through fraud or other undue means and that the award must
be vacated.

At such time as the documents have been provided to

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES, they will supplement
their memorandum with respect to this issue.
Because of defects in the award and procedure of the
arbitration, adequate grounds exist for vacation of the award by this
Court.

Despite the interests of the Court in resolution of disputes,

the Legislature has specified that arbitration proceedings which do

- 10 -

not meet certain criteria may not be confirmed.

That is the case in

this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983.

Robert F. Bentley
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Opposition to Motion to Confirm Award and Motion to
Vacate Award, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 30th day of
November, 1983, to the following:
Robert F. Babcock
Walstad, Kasimer, Tansey & Ittig
185 South State Street
Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Boulevard #10
Ogden, Utah 84401

Michael Glassman
Attorney for Redd Roofing
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P. 0. Box 226
Kaysville, Utah 84037

David B. Smith
First Interstate Bank of Arizona
P. 0. Box 20551
Phoenix, Arizona 85036

Joseph Smith Plumbing
483 Eat Maryrose Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Robert F. Bentley

shall submit to questions or other examination.
The arbitrator may vary thib procedure but shall
afford full and equal opportunity to the parties for
the presentation of any materia! or relevant proofs.
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be
received in evidence by the arbitrator.
The names and addresses of all witnesses and ex(libits in order received shall be made a party of
the record.
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party
Unless the law provides to the contrary.the arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party, who.
after due notice, fails to be present or fails to obtain an adjournment. An award shall not be made
solely on the default oi z party. The arbitrator shall
require the party who is present to submit such
evidence as deemed necessary* for the making of an
iward.
31. Evidence
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire
md shall produce sue!) additional evidence as the
irbitrator may deem necessary to an uncerstandxig and determination of the dispute. An arbitra:or authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of any party.
?r independently. The arbitaior shall be the judge
}f the admissibility of the evidence offered and
ronfonnity to legal ruler, of evidence shall not be
lecessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence
Dt" all of the arbitrators and all of the parties, except
vhzTt any of the parties, is absent in default o; has
rvaivec his or her right to be present.
52. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of
Documents
The arbitrator may receive and consider the eviience of witnesses by affidavit, giving it such
veight as seems appropriate after consideration of
my objections made to its admission.

3 3 . Inspection or Investigation
.An arbitrator finding it necessary to make an inspection or investigation in connection with the
arbitration shall direct the AAA to so advise the
parties. The arbitrator shall set the time and the
AAA shall notify the parties thereof. Any party
who so desires may be present at such inspection
or investigation. In the event that one or both parties are not present at the inspection or investigation, the arbitrator shall make a verbal or written
report to the parties and afford them an opportunity to comment.
34. Conservation of Property
The arbitrator may issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which
is the subject matter of the arbitration without
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final
determination of the dispute.
35. Closing of Hearings
The arbitrator shall specifically inquire of the parties whether they have any further proofs to offer
or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative
replies, the arbitrator shall declare tile hearings
closed and a minute thereof shall be recorded. If
briefs arc to be filed, the hearings shall be declared
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for
the receipt of briefs. If documents 3re to be filed as
provided IOT in Section 32 and the date set for their
receipt is later than thai set for the receipt of briefs,
the later date shall be the date of closing the hearing. The time limit within which the arbitrator is
required to make an award shall commence to run.
In the absence of other agreements by the parties,
upon the closing of the hearings.

Ml documents not filed with the arbitrator at the
rearing, but arranged for at the hearing or subsequently by agreement of the parties, shall be filed
vith the AAA for transmission to the arbitrator.
Ul parties shall be afforded opportunity to examne such documents.

36. Reopening of Hearings
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at
will, or upon application of a party at any time before the award is made. If the reopening of the hearing would prevent the making of the award within
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the
contract out of which the controversy has arisen,
the matter may not be reopened, unless the parties
agree upon the extension of such tune limit. When
no specif c date is fixed in the contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator
shall have thirty days from the closing of the reopened hearings within which to make an award.

i:

13

37. Waiver of Oral Hearings
The parties may provide, by written agreement, for
the waiver of oral hearings. If the parties are unable to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall
specify a fair and equitable procedure.
38. Waiver of Rules
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after
knowledge that any provision or requirement of
these Rules has not been complied with and who
fails to state an objection thereto in writing, shall
be deemed to have waived the right to object.
39. Extensions of Time
The parties may modify any period of time by
mutual agreement. The AAA for good cause may
extend any period of time established by these
Rules, except the time for making the award. The
AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension
of time and its reason therefor.
40. Communication with Arbitrator and
Serving of Notices
There shall be no communication between the parties and an arbitrator other than at oral hearings.
Any other oral or written communications from
the parties to the arbitrator shall be directed to the
AAA for transmittal to the arbitrator.
Each party to an agreement which provides for arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed to have
consented that any papers, notices or process necessary or proper for the initiation or continuation
of an arbitration under these Rules and for any
court action in connection therewith or for the
entry of judgment on any award made thereunder
maybe served upon such party by mail addressed to
such party or its attorney at the last known address or by personal service, within or without the
state wherein the arbitration is to be held (whether
such party be within or without the United States
of America), provided that reasonable opportunity
to be heard with regard thereto has been granted
such party.

toi and. unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or
specified by law. not later than thirty days from
the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings
have been waived, from the date of transmitting
the final statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
42. Form of Award
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed
either by the sole arbitrator or by at least a majority if there be more than one. It shall be executed
in the manner required by law.
4 3 . Scope of Award
Tne arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable and within the terms of
the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator, in the
award, shall assess arbitration fees and expenses as
prodded in Sections 48 and 50 equally or in favor
of any party and. in the event any administrative
fees or expenses are due the AAA. in favor of the
AAA.
4 4 . Award upon Settlement
If the parties settle their dispute during the course
of the arbitration, the arbitrator, upon their request, may set forth the terms of the agreed settlement in an award.
4 5 . Delivery of Award to Parties
Parties si:all accept as legal delivery of the award
the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in
the mail by the AAA. addressed to such party at
its las: known ad ares?, c to its attorney, or personal service o: the award, or the filing of the award
in any manner which may be prescribed by law.
46. Reiease of Documents for Judicial Proceedings
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a party furnish to such, party, at it> expense, certified
facsimiles of any papers in the AAA's possession
that may he required \v. indicia) proceedings relating to the arbitration.

4 1 . Time of Award
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitra-

4 7 . Applications to Court
No judicial proceeding by a party relating to the
subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a
waiver of the party's right to arbitrate.
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September 12, 1983

Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
RE: 77 110 0130 82
Walstad, Kasimer, Tansey
Worthington & Kimball
& Ittig
Construction Company
185 S. State Street, Ste 1000
-andSalt Lake City, UT 84111
C & A Enterprises;
C & A Development;
Robert F. Bentley
C & A Companies;
General Counsel
L.K. Kenriksen dba
C & A Companies, Inc.
Western States Const.;
P.O. Box 1549
Hoibrook Company, Inc.
Scottsdale, AZ 84252
Staker Paving and
Construction Company
L.M. Kenriksen dba
Salt Lake City or Ogden,
Western States Construction
UT
790 East 400 North
Linden, UT 84062
Steven M. Ashby, Controllei
Hoibrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P.O. Box 226
Kaysville, UT S4037
Joseph C. Rust, Esq.
Kesler & Rust
2000 Beneficial Bldg.
36 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Gentlemen:
This will confirm that the hearings in the abovecaptioned arbitration were held on July 14 and 15, 1983
This will advise that the Arbitrators declared the
hearings closed on September 2, 1983.

"EXHIBIT B"

September 12, 1983
Paae 2

Therefore, the Award will be due thirty (30) days
thereafter or by, on or before October 2, 1983.
Very truly yours,

/rp.

, r

ILnM'.-Uj

'IUN~->/
Mark E. Appel
' '

•/

• ,

/

Reaional Director
MEA:km xc: Peter W. Eillings
George E. Lyman
B. Lue Bettilyon
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Robert F. Babcock and
James 3. Tansey of
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG
Attorneys for Claimant
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
WORTHINGTON 6c KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership,
Claimant,

:
:

MOTION FOR REOPENING
OF HEARING

:

vs.

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES,
an Arizona partnership, C 4c A COMPANIES,
INC., an Arizona corporation,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:

No. 77-110-0130-82

:

Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association Claimant W & K hereby moves the panel to reopen
the hearing to clarify an issue raised for the first time in Respondents' Reply Brief as
to the status of C & A Enterprises and C & A Companies, Inc.

It is and has been

the understanding of W & K that there is and has been no dispute that ail three C &
A parties are jointly liable for the claims of W 6c K.
The facts summarized hereinafter, evidences that all three C 6c A entities
are jointly and severally liable.
1.

The contract was initially entered into between W & K and C 6c A

Development Company.

Article 14 of said contract requires written consent to assign

the contract.
2.

C & A Development obtained the written consent of W & K to assign

its contract to C 6c A Enterprises.
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3.
Enterprises.
4.

The Certificate of Substantial Completion was directed to C 6c A
(See Exh. 23B behind Tab 8)
The property was deeded by C & A Development to C & A Enterprises

of which C & A Companies is a general partner.

(See the Deed of Trust and Security

Agreement, the last document behind Tab 28)
5.

Both of the letters written by Robert F. Bentley to W & K and Robert

E. Lee were signed by Robert F. Bentley, General Counsel for Permaloy Corporation
and C & A Enterprises.
6.

(See Exhs. 67, D)

AH of the pay requests were submitted to C a A Companies, the partner

responsible for handling payments.
7.

(See Exh. 23A)

As further involvement of C & A Companies see the letter of Richard

Campbell on C 6c A Companies' stationery in response to the final pay application of W
6c K (Exh. 24) and letter of Gary Worthington to C 6c A Companies (Exh. E).
8.

The original arbitration was filed solely against C & A Enterprises.

9. The amended claim for arbitration brought in C 6c A Development and C
& A Companies.
10.

The answer filed by C 6c A Enterprises and the Counterclaim of C 6c

A Enterprises states on page one in the first

paragraph "named Respondent and

Counterclaimant, a party to an arbitration agreement contained in a written contract. .
• .".

Further, paragraph two of C 6c A Enterprise's response states "Respondent also

demands arbitration pursuant to the contract. . . .".
11. The letter from Holbrook to the American Arbitration Association dated
July 15, 1982 refers to the contract between C 6c A Enterprises and Holbrook.

(See

also said contract behind Tab 19)
12. The letter of counsel for Respondent (C 6c A Enterprises) dated August
12, 1982, refers to the contract between W 6c K and Respondent (C 6c A Enterprises).
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13. The ietter of October 12, 1982 to American Arbitration Association from
counsel for C & A refers to the claims of C & A Enterprises against W & K and the
subcontractors for failure to provide for arbitration in their subcontracts as required
by the "agreement with C & A Enterprises".
14.

The letter of April 14, 19S3 from counsel for Respondents refers both

to "Respondent C <5c Afs counterclaims" and "pursuant

to the contract

between

Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and C & A. . . .".
15. The correspondence from Respondents to the AAA was typically on the
letterhead of C & A Companies, Inc.
16. From the beginning of the hearing, including the opening statement, all
parties, including counsel for Respondents, referred to the three C & A Entities as
simply C 6c A.
17.

The 58 page Respondents 1 Brief simply refers to "C 5c A".

The only

reference in the text of the Brief to a specific entity is found on pages 35-36 which
states C <5c A Enterprises should be awarded a sum for business interruption damages in
an amount of between $480,000 and $522,000. Further, under Section S entitled "Award"
the amounts requested to be awarded to "C & A" refer to all amounts alleged at the
hearing.

Lastly, on page 57 of Respondents 1 Brief it states "Respondents respectfully

request the panel to enter an award in their favor and to hold that Petitioners are no
(sic) entitled to an award".
It is the position of W & K that the "pleadings" and correspondence with
the American Arbitration Association, the evidence presented at the hearing, the posture
of "C 6c A" at the hearing and in its brief in consistently referring to all three C &
A entities as "C <5c A" even to the requesting of relief for C i A Enterprises clarifies
this issue.
Nonetheless, if the panel feels it would be helpful to clarify once and for
all the relationship between the C 6c A entities W & K would request a short reopening
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of the hearing for this sole purpose.

The rehearing would not take more than a couple

of hours and could easily be held within the time needed for the panel to make the
award.

Further, it should not delay the panel in making the award.
Respectfully submitted this

3&

day of August, 1983.

WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG

By: %lrtjt t tJsuA
Robert F. Babcock

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion for Reopening of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this
August, 1983 to the following:
Robert F. Bentley and
Vaughn Armstrong
C & A Development Co.
P. O. Box 1549
Scottsdale, Arizona 85252

> ' " day of

IN THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

Worthington & Kimball Construction Company
-andC & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises
and C & A Companies, Inc.
-andL.M. Henriksen d/b/a Western States Construction,
Holbrook Company, Inc. and Staker Paving and
Construction Co.

No. 77-110-013-82

RESPONSE T O MOTION FOR REOPENING OF HEARING

Respondents, C & A Development Co., C & A Enterprises, and
C & A Companies, Inc., hereby respond tc Claimant's Motion for
Reopening of Hearing.

The Motion must be denied as there is no basis

for reopening the hearing.
Claimant contends that the issue was first raised in
Respondent's Reply Erief and that Claimant presumed that there had
been no dispute that all three parties are jointly liable.
not the case.

This is

The issue was raised at the time Claimant amended their

Demand for Arbitration.

In response to the Amended Demand,

Respondents stated that "not all of the parties named as Respondents
in such Amended Demand are proper parties".

(This was contained in a

letter to the American Arbitration Association, December 10th, 1962,
which was forwarded to counsel for Claimant by the American
Arbitration Association on December 15, 1982.

See Exhibits A & B

attached hereto.) Clearly, Claimant was aware that there was a dispute
as to which if any, of Respondents was liable.

Even in the absence of a specific statement questioning
whether one or more Respondents is a proper party, basic legal
principles require Claimant to prove a case with respect to any party
from which it wishes to claim an award.

Merely naming a party is not

sufficient to make it jointly liable with another party.
Claimants failed to address the issue at any time during the
protracted hearings held in connection with this matter.

In its

briefs, Claimant did not identify any legal theory upon which joint
liability could be based.

Claimant failed to meet its burden to prove

liability of C & A Enterprises of C & A Companies, Inc.

Respondents

had no obligation to address the issue inasmuch as it had not been
addressed by Claimants nor did they have an obligation to remind
Claimant of issues which Claimant had raised but overlooked in
presentation of its case.

Granting Claimants Motion to Reopen the

Hearing would be inappropriate as Claimant had notice of the dispute
as to proper parties and adequate time to prepare for and to address
the question in the course of the hearing. Claimant's Motion must be
denied.
In addition, Claimant's Motion must be stricken and the
allegation and argument set forth must not be considered by the panel.
Claimant, by way of the Motion, improperly attempts to supplement both
the record and its briefs.

The allegations of fact with respect to

which no evidence appears in the record and the legal arguments to
justify an award against C & A Enterprises cr C & A Companies are not
related to the Question of whether the hearinc should be reooened.

-
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Even if those arguments were to be considered, they do not
establish a basis for relief against C & A Enterprises or C & A
Companies, Inc.

Worthington & Kimball's submission of the Certificate

of Substantial Completion or the pay applications to someone other
than C & A Development Co. does not make that other person liable
under the contract.

The fact that the property was transferred to C &

A Enterprises or that letterhead of C & A Companies, Inc. (or Permaloy
Corporation) was used in correspondence does not make either liable on
the contract.

The fact that a owner of a property may be entitled to

a claim for loss of use against the party responsible for such loss
does not imply that the owner has any liability to such other party.
In the event that Claimant's motion is granted and the
hearing is reopened, Respondents request that sufficient time be set
aside that Respondents may supplement their surrebuttal case which 'was
shortened by Respondents in an effort to complete the hearing in a
timely matter.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 19S3

C & A DEVELOPMENT CO.

EY: /s/Vaughn S. Armstrong
Vaughn £. Armstrong
Assistant General Counsel

R

tCE/VED OCT -

/

; £ JO&J

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

789 SHERMAN STREET. DENVER. COLORADO 80203
SUITE 430
(303)831-053?=
0823

September 29, 1983
Robert F. Babcockf Esq,
Walstad, Kasimer, Tansey
Re:
& Ittiq
185 S. State Street, Ste 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Robert F. Bentley
General Counsel
C & A Companies, Inc.
P.O. Box 1549
Scottsdale, AZ 84252
L.M. Henriksen dba
Western States Construction
790 East 400 North
Linden, UT 84062

77 110 0130 82
Worthington & Kimball
Construction Company
-andC & A Enterprises;
C St A Development;
C & A Companies;
L.M. Henriksen dba
Western States Const.;
Holbrook Company, Inc.
Staker Paving and
Cons trueton Company
Salt Lake City or Ogden,
UT

Steven M. Ashby, Controller
Holbrook Comoanv, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P.O. Box 226
Kaysville, UT 84037
Joseph C. Rust, Esq.
Kesler & Rust
2000 Beneficial Bldg.
36 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Gentlemen:
This will advise the Parties that after careful
consideration of the Parties' contentions, the Arbitrators,
per Section 36 of the Rules, have determined to re-open
hearings for the above-captioned arbitration.
Further, this will advise the Parties that the Arbitrators will direct the Parties as to the necessity of
-additional hearings or briefs in the future.

ter!^\\Ap>HJ^
V\
teqiona j~Direilt&r
MEA:jel
xc:
Messrs

1'

\

Bettilyon, Billings, and Lyman

EXHIBIT E"

v \i

BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general
partnership!
Claimant,

RECEIVED OCT 2 0 JSLo
NOTICE OF HEARING

v.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, C & A
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership, and C & A COMPANIES,
INC., an Arizona corporation,

No. 77-110-0130-82

Respondents.

Pursuant to the notice sent to you under date of
September 29, 1983 by the Denver office of the American Arbitration
Association, the reopened hearing will be held at the 7th floor
conference room of Fabian & Clencenin in the Continental Bank
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah beginning at 9:00 a.m. on October 24,
1983.

The arbitrators have detenrtined that the scope of the hearing

shall be limited to evidence and argument as to whether any award
can or should be made for or against any party other than the
parties to the contract, i.e., C & A Development Company, as owner,

partnership and L. M. Henriksen, dba Western States Construction,
a sole proprietorship, as contractor, and as to the allocation of
costs and fees.
DATED this 18th day of October, 198 3.

.-.*/ ?JF C & A

COMPANIES,

INC.

P.O. BOX 1549 • SCOTTSDALE. ARIZONA 85252
(602) 947-7775
OBERT F. BENTLEY

cnior Vice President and General Counsel
AUGHN S. ARMSTRONG
ssisiant General Counsel

October 21, 1933

Mr. Mark E. Appel
Regional Director
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
789 Sherman Street
Suite 430
Denver, Colorado 80203
Re: 77 110 0130 82
Worthington & Kimball
Construction Company
-andC & A Enterprises
Salt Lake City or Ogden, Utah
Dear Mr. Appel:
By telephone yesterday, we advised you ihai on October 20th
we received notice from Mr. Billings t2iat a hearing in the
above-referenced matter had been sew for 9:00 o'clock a.m. October
24th. We advised you in that conversation and by this letter confirm
that neither Mr. Bentley nor myself will be available on that date
for the hearing due to prior commitments and insufficient notice.
You indicated that you would attempt to reschedule the hearing for
November 3rd or 4th but that Mr. Babock had net returned your call as
of this afternoon.
We object to the hearing being held upon inadequate notice
In addition, we object to any hearing being held to
determine "whether any award can or should be made for or against any
party other than the parties to the contract11, unless Respondents
are permitted in connection with such hearing to present additional
surrebuttal evidence which was not presented due to the oanei's
direction that the hearing was to be come! :eo on JU.
.5th, 1983.
ery truly yours,

Vaughn S. Armstrong
cc:

Robert Babcock, Esq.

LAW O F F I C E S O F
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July 14, 1983

Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
Walstad, Kasimer, Tansey & Ittig
185 S. State Street
Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert F. Bentley
General Counsel
C & A Companies, Inc.
P.O. Box 1549
Scottsdale, Arizona 84252
Re:

77-110-0130-82
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company
-andC & A Enterorises

Gentlemen:
As scheduled, the board of arbitrators have met and made
a preliminary reviev: of the evidence heard and documents received
to date. Based on that review, we request that counsel focus
their post-hearing briefs on the following issues:
1.

Parking Lots.
a.

Are the apparent defects in the asphalt paving
the responsibility of Worthington & Kimball?
Was there any agreement between Worthington &
Kimball and C & A on this issue as a basis for
the release by Worthington & Kimball of Staker?
Why should not C & A be awarded the amount set
forth in Exhibit 8 3 (Parson proposal) for the
defects in the asphalt paving?

EXHIBIT H"

LAW O F F I C E S

or

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
Robert F. Bent-Ley, Esq,
July 14, 1983
Page Two

2.

Condition of Tanks.
a.

Who is responsible for work of Ogcen Industrial
Plastics?

b.

Was work done to the date Ogcen Industrial
Plastics was discharged in compliance with
specifications agreed to by owner and Ocden?

c.

Kow handle award, if any, for Ogcen1 s unpaid
portion -- need for lien release?

d.

Is Worthington & Kimball entitled to 5% on any
award made for work by Ocden Industrial Plastics?

e.

What is the effect, if any, on the issues of
disclaimer in change orders nos. 17 and IS?

f.

If C & A is entitled to any award on this item,
is it to be made against Worthington & Kimball
or Ogden Industrial Plastics?

3.

What is effect on responsibility of Worthington & Kimba
for condition of interior walls in light of inadequate
system installed by owner to eliminate moisture and tox
fumes?

4.

When did "substantial completion" occur?
a.

Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount on
contractor's request for final payment?

b.

If so, what penalty, if any, should be assessed
against C & A?

c.

What is the effect on any claims by C & A based
on deficient construction in view of the one
year warranty contained in provision 2.4.1 of
the design-build agreement?

d.

A substantial portion of the punch list items
appear to be nit-picking. What amount, if any,
should be awarded on punch list items?

LAW O F F I C E S O F
r

AEIAN

&

CLENDENIN

Robert F. Babcock, Esq,
Robert F. Bentley, Esa,
July 14, 1983
Page Three

5.

What is effect, if any, of the Permaloy - C & A relationship on the respective responsibilities of owner and contractor?

6.

Rollins, Brown and Gunnell Soil Report (Exhibit K ) .

7.

8.

a.

What is the effect of the contract provision
(112.5.2 as amended) with respect to such report?

b.

Did contractor deviate from any recommendations
of the Rollins, Brcwn and Gunnell report?

c.

If not, does reliance on that report relieve
contractor from any liability for cracks due
to settling or expansion?

d.

Is the perimeter crack the responsibility of
the owner, Buehner or Worthington & Kimball?

e.

Has settlement been excessive under the plans
and specifications accepted by the owner?

f.

What dollar damages, if any, for (1) wall panels
and (2) floor cracks?

Roof Condition.
a.

Who is responsible for deflection of roof area
over dock?

b.

What is effect of elimination of gravel on roof
condition -- who is responsible?

c.

What defects, if any, exist?

d.

Are they the responsibility of the contractor?

e.

What amount, if any, be awarded C & A for any
defects?

We believe any award to Worthington & Kimball should be
conditioned on delivery of lien waivers or release of
lien by all subcontractors.
a.

Hew handle Ocden Industrial Plastics' claim?

LAVv o r r i C E S

Or

FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N

Robert F. Babcoc*, Esq,
Robert F. Bentlev, Esc,
July 14, 1983
Page Four

The foregoing is not intended to preclude either party
from addressing any other issue which it believes to be important,
but to suggest the issues as to which the panel needs full exposition of the position of each party.
Very truly yours,

PWB:bw
cc:

George E. Lyman, Esq.
B. Lue Bettilyon

Robert F. Babcock and
James J. Tansey of
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership,
Claimant,

:
:

' REPLY OF
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL

:

vs.

:

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation, C i * A ENTERPRISES,
an Arizona partnership, C & A COMPANIES,
INC., an Arizona corporation,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:

No, 77-110-0130-82

Claimant hereby replies to the Response of Respondents as to the liability
of the respective C & A entities in the subject arbitration proceeding as well as to
the apportionment of costs and fees.
I.

PROPER PARTY
Since C H

stipulated that the subject contract between W & K and C &

A Development Company was assigned by C & A Development Company to C <5c A
Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, in March of 1931 it was agreed that no
further evidence would be submitted by either party.

Other than the foregoing fact

which was stipulated to by the parties as referred to in the Notice and Order from
the panel of arbitrators dated October 24, 19S3 no other evidence, subsequent to the
hearing, was submitted by Claimant to the panel.
Based upon the foregoing stipulation and for the sake of simplification W &
K requests that the award be entered against C cc A Enterprises. The C & A entities

acknowledge in their Response that C 6c A Enterprises is the appropriate party to the
arbitration proceeding. Because of the individual liability of the general partners of C
6c A Enterprises W 6c K will not pursue the secondary liability of C 6: A Development.
During the enforcement proceedings, if needed, W <$c K will pursue the joint and several
liability of all of the partners of C 6c A Enterprises including C 6c A Companies, Inc.
II.

COSTS AND FEES
Rule 43 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provides:
The arbitratorfs) may grant any remedy or relief which is
just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement
of the parties. The arbitrator(s), in the award, shall assess
arbitration fees and expenses as provided in Sections 48
and 50 equally'or in favor of any party and, in the event
any administrative fees or expenses are due the AAA, in
favor of the AAA.
In addition to the administrative fees and expenses the arbitrators T fees are

to be allocated in accordance with the agreement of the parties to this proceeding.
Claimant

and

Respondent

agree

that

the

panel

may

apportion

the

administrative fees paid to the AAA, the fees paid to the respective arbitrators, and
the miscellaneous expenses of the arbitration.

The parties also agree that the cost of

witnesses is to be born by the respective parties. The only area of dispute is that of
the cost of the stenographic record.
In the same sense that the parties advanced the administrative fees and
arbitrators 1 fees which were to be subseauently apportioned by the panel both Claimant
and Respondent agreed to advance one half each of the cost of the stenographic record
which cost was to be apportioned in a similar fashion to the administrative and arbitrator
fees.
W & K submits that in considering how to apportion the foregoing fees the
panel should consider the nature of the claims of the respective parties, how the claims
affected the length and therefore the cost of the hearing and the meritoriousness of
the respective claims of the parties. In considering the foregoing W 6c K respectfully
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Respectfully submitted this 4th day of November, 1933.
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG

Robert F. Babcock

1

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
* * *

2
3
4

In the Matter of the
Arbitration between
Case No. 77 110 0130 82

5
6
7
8
9
10

Testimony of:

WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION CO., and
C & A COMPANIES: L. M.
EENRIKSEN dba WESTERN STATES
CONSTRUCTION; HOLBROOK
COMPANY, INC.; STAKER PAVING
AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.

RALPH ROLLINS

* * *

11
12
13
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nc day of June
14
15
16
17
13
19
20
21

1983, the testimony of RALPH ROLLINS, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the claimant herein, in the
above-entitled matter, was taken before Linda Van Tassell,
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter
and Notary public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at
the hour of 3:45 p.m. of said day at 700 Continental Bank
Building, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

22
23
24

* * *

25

1931

i no

1

Eloor slab to the wall?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Is it also common that because of expected

4

settlement, there occurs a perimeter crack?

5

A

Yes, that's true.

6

Q

Is it also common occurrence to have some spalling

7
8
9

in some of the joints in a double tee building?
A

I think that quite often occurs.
MR. BILLINGS:

You say in here on page 4, "It is

10

our opinion if the foundations for proposed facility are

11

proportioned using an allowable soil bearing pressure of 2f500

12

pounds per square foot, no serious problems will occur.due to

12

swelling of the subsurface soils."

14

THE WITNESS:

Provided —

thatfs provided the,-

15

recommendation is complied with.

16

the necessary precautions to keep it from becoming wet.

17
18
19
20
21

MR. BILLINGS:

I've said in there ycu take

Now if a building with this

double tee-type _c_gjis_.txii.et ion-TEE WITNESS:

I didn't really know at that time

it was qoinc to be a double tee-type construction.
MK. biijLiiNCiS:

it tney ronowec your

22

recommendations in your soil report with that type cf building

23

and tied the floor to the walls, would you still have expected

24

a perimeter cracking?

25

THE WITNESS:

It could have occurred.

One has

1980

0 43 c l a
RfCi:

FILE:,

Robert F. Bentley
7425 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
(602) 947-7775
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership,
et al,
Plaintiffs,

NO.

83387

$

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al,
Defendants

The undersigned, Robert F. Bentley, hereby gives notice of
his appearance of counsel for C & A Enterprises and C & A Development
Co. in the above-referenced cause of action.
RESPECTFULLY SUEMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983

Robert F. Bentley
Attorney for Defendants
C & A Development Company,
C & A Enterprises, and
Permaloy Corporation

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this
30th day of November, 1983, to the following:
Robert Babcock
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salot Lake City, Utah 84111

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Blvd. #10
Ogden, Utah 84401

Michael Glassman
Attorney for Redd Roofing
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P.O. Box 226
Kaysville, Utah 84037

David B. Smith
First Interstate Bank of Arizona
P.O. Box 20551
Phoenix, Arizona 85036
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Robert F. Bentley
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
(602)-947-7775

HUEFILED

•

.-ERK
- o i i . _

to 5 il 2M fife

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership,
et al,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

NO.

83387

MOTION TO CONTINUE

vs.
C

& A

DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al,

)

Defendants)

Comes now, Defendants C & A Development Co. and C & A
Enterprises, by and through their attorney undersigned and hereby
request that this Court continue the hearing set for December 2nd,
1983, in the above captioned cause to a time mutually convenient to
this Court and the parties thereto as and for the reason that
Defendant's attorney will be in Mexico City on previously scheduled
business and further Defendant's attorney will be in Chicago the week
of December 5th on corporate business.

Attorney for Defendant would

be able to attend a hearing on Friday, December 9th, 1983, if said
date would be acceptable to this Court.
Further, moving Defendants have made a Motion to Vacate the
Award.

In order to permit Plaintiff adequate time to respond, both

Plaintiff1s Motion to Confirm and Defendants1 Motion to Vacate should
be heard together at a later hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983

Robert F. Bentley
7525 East Camelback Ro4d
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
Attorney for C & A Companies, Inc.
and C & A Enterpriese
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this
30th day of November, 1983, to the following:
Robert Babcock
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salot Lake City, Utah 84111

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Blvd. #10
Ogden, Utah 84401

Michael Glassman
Attorney for Redd Roofing
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P.O. Box 226
Kaysville, Utah 84037

David B. Smith
First Interstate Bank of Arizona
P.O. Box 20551
Phoenix, Arizona 85036

±ZA-*JU<Z±+J(

D 4 b b c b

Robert F. Babcoek of
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITOG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, et al,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO VACATE

Plaintiffs,

ah

vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al,

Civil No. 83387

Defendants.
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Robert F. Babcock of and for Walstad
Kasimer Tansey & Ittig, hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants 1
Motion to Vacate Award.
FACTS
The claims of the parties to this proceeding arise out of the construction
of the project known as the Permaloy Building in the Weber Industrial Park near Ogden,
Utah.

Plaintiff, the general contractor, claimed the unpaid contract balance together

with interest thereon plus other consequential damages. Defendants C & A Development
Company, C & A Enterprises, and C & A Companies, the owner-developer, alleged that
the cost to complete and repair the subject building exceeded the contract balance due
Plaintiff by approximately $1,000,000.00.
The contract between the parties, attached as Exhibit "B,T to the Motion to
Confirm Award, provides in Article 16 that all disputes concerning the contract be
submitted to the American Arbitration Association for final and binding arbitration.
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Pursuant to said contractural provision, the parties submitted to said American
Arbitration Association the subject claims.
The panel of arbitrators consisted of Peter W. Billings, Esq., the senior
partner of Fabian & Clendenin, George E. Lyman, Esq. and B. Lue Bettilyon, owner of
Bettilyon Construction Company. Seventeen days of hearings were held on April 25 to
29, May 16 to 20, June 20 to 24 and July 14 and 15, 1983. During said hearings a total
of 23 witnesses were called by the respective parties. The transcript of the hearings,
including the depositions, exceeded 3,000 pages in length.

Plaintiffs introduced 84

exhibits (many were multi-page exhibits) and Defendants introduced 59 exhibits (again
many were multi-page exhibits).

During the hearings, the parties were given full

opportunity to call all witnesses they desired. Both parties were given the opportunity
to file and did in fact file both post-hearing and reply briefs exceeding 180 pages in
length.

The hearings covered nearly 100 disputed issues.
The panel of arbitrators rendered an award on November 7, 1983, a copy

of which is attached as Exhibit TTATT to the Motion to Confirm Award. Plaintiffs brought
their Motion to Confirm Award on November 18, 1983. Defendants responded by filing
their Motion to Vacate Award.

Both motions are before the court for disposition.
ARGUMENT

The parties to this dispute agreed by contract to resolve their disputes by
arbitration. In recent years arbitration has become more and more the accepted mode
of settling disputes in the construction industry.

All major segments of the building

community provide for arbitration in their standard form contracts. The chief justice
of the United States Supreme Court is a staunch advocate of the use of alternate
dispute resolution procedures and arbitration in particular.

The Utah Supreme Court

recently stated in a case upholding the constitutionality of arbitration that "the trend
toward such inter se agreements without resort to litigation reflects a good, practical

119

- 3 -

way to resolve disputes/ 1

Lindon City vs. Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d

1070, 1073 (Utah 1981).
An earlier Utah court indicated that arbitration is favored in the law as a
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating differences by a tribunal whose award
is final and persons are being encouraged to resort to such procedures.

Giannopulos

vs. Pappas, 15 P.2d 335 (Utah 1932).
Defendants C & A Development Company and C <5c A Enterprises challenge
the award on four grounds. Each of the grounds will be discussed in the order argued
by said Defendants.
before discussing the merits of said Defendants 1 arguments it is important
to reaffirm the standard of review to be given by this Court to the subject arbitration
award. The discussion in the case of Park Imperial, Inc. vs. E. L. Farmer Construction
Co., 454 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1969) properly sets forth the standard of review.
Were the trial court required to try each case de novo
the reason for arbitration agreements woulde frustrated.
(Citation omitted)
In the instant case the person objecting to the award
had the burden of making an "adequate showing" to the
trial court wherein the award should be set aside. This
Court on appeal is bound to view the action of the trial
court in a light most favorable to upholding the trial
courtTs determination, (citations omitted) just as the trial
court was required to view the arbitration award in a
light most favorable to upholding the said award.
A party seeking to set aside an arbitration award on
account of error has the burden to affirmatively establish
the existence of such error and the fact that it was
prejudicial. (Citation omitted)
Further, the case of Mars Constructors, Inc. vs. Tropical Enterprises, Ltd.,
460 P.2d 317 (Hawaii 1969) sheds further light on the standard of review. The Hawaii
Supreme Court, in discussing a motion to vacate an arbitration award, based on a
statute having the same four grounds for vacating an arbitration award as the Utah
statute, stated:

This Court has decided to confine judicial review to the
strictest possible limits. (Citations omitted) We reaffirm
this holding because we believe an extensive judicial
review of arbitration awards would frustrate the intent
of the parties to avoid litigation and would also nullify
the legislative objective in the enactment of the
Arbitration and Awards statute.
The parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate, and they
thereby assumed all the hazards of the arbitration
process, including the risk that the arbitrators may make
mistakes in the application of law and in their findings
of fact. In (earlier cases) this Court held that such
mistakes of arbitrators did not vitiate awards and that
the review of awards by the courts were limited to the
provisions of the arbitration statute.
I. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT EXCEED THEIR POWERS IN RENDERING
THE AWARD.
A.

THE AWARD WAS RENDERED TIMELY

The parties agreed in the subject contract to abide by the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. A copy of the pertinent rules are attached as Exhibit
M TT
A to DefendantsT Motion. Rule 41 provides:
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or specified by
law, not later than thirty days from the date of closing
of the hearings. . . .
Rule 36 provides as follows:
The hearing may be reopened by the arbitrator at will,
or upon application of a party at any time before the
award is made. If the reopening of the hearing would
prevent the making of the award within the specific time
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of which
the controversy has arisen, the matter may not be
reopened unless the parties agree upon the extension of
such time limit. When no specific date is fixed in the
contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and
the arbitrator shall have thirty days from the closing of
the reopened hearings within which to make an award.
The hearings were initially closed on September 2, 1983 but were reopened
on September 29, 1983. The reopened hearing was held on October 24, 1983 by means of
a telephone conference in which the parties simply stipulated that in March, 1981, the
contract between Plaintiff and C & A Development Company was assigned by C & A
Development Company to C & A Enterprises. There was no evidence or other argument
presented.

The parties, however, further stipulated that said Defendants would have

until and including October 28, 1983 to brief the effects of said assignment anH that

- 5 Plaintiffs would have until November 4, 1983 to respond to the brief of said Defendants.
Upon receipt of said briefs the arbitrators were to close the hearing.

Rule 35 states,

in part, as follows:
If briefs are to be filed, the hearing shall be declared
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for the
receipt of briefs. . . . The time limit within which the
arbitrator is required to make an award shall commence
to run, in the absence of other agreements by the parties,
upon the closing of the hearings.
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 41, the award was to be made by December 4,
1983.

The award was in fact made well before that time in that the award was

rendered November 7, 1983 and transmitted by letter dated November 11, 1983 from
the American Arbitration Association to the respective parties.
Defendants argue that the award must have been made on or before October
2 which is within thirty days of the closing of the initial hearings.

It should be

emphasized that there is no specific time fixed in the contract within which an award
must be made. The contract simply provides for adhering to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
Defendants either overlook or ignore the affect of Rule 36, quoted in its
entirety above, which states in pertinent part:
When no specific date is fixed in the contract, the
arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator
shall have thirty days from the closing of the reopened
hearings within which to make an award.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was a problem with the
timeliness of award, said Defendants clearly waived any right to object to the timeliness
of award.

A case which is dispositive of this issue is Ash Apartments vs. Martinez,

658 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1982).

The parties in that case, like the parties in the instant

case, agreed to arbitrate their disputes pursuant to the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

There was a disputed issue as to
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whether the parties had consented to an extension of the thirty day period in which
the arbitrators had to enter an award.

The court stated:

The question of whether Plaintiffs consented to an
extention is irrelevent to the disposition of this issue
because it is uncontroverted that Plaintiffs chose not to
object to the timeliness of the award until after it was
announced with a result which was unfavorable to them.
. . Since Plaintiffs here also chose to wait until it saw
the results of the award, it waived its right to assert
the untimeliness of the award as a defect. Consequently,
the arbitrators' award will not be vacated on this basis.
Such are the facts in the incident case. Said Defendants in their Response
to Motion for Reopening of Hearing dated September 13, 1983 made no mention of the
timeliness of the award.

Neither did said Defendants object in their Response of

Respondents dated October 28, 1983 nor in their Respondent's Memorandum Regarding
Award of Costs and Fees dated November 3, 1983. If said Defendants truly believed
that the time to render an award lapsed on October 2, 1983 then said Defendants
clearly waived any objection by failing to raise the objection during the telephone
conference of October 24, 1983 and the briefs of October 28 and November 3 of 1983.
Said Defendants chose not to object to the timeliness of the arbitration award until
after the unfavorable result was announced.
Again, the rules clearly provide that the arbitrator may reopen the hearing
and that the time for rendering an award runs thirty days from the closing of the
reopened hearings. Therefore, the award was rendered well within the time requirements
set forth in the rules.
R.

THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT LIMIT THE EVIDENCE
Said Defendants assert in their Motion to Vacate that the arbitrators directed

that the rebuttal case be limited to two days. Such is not the case. The true facts
are that the parties, during the week of June 20 to 24 agreed that the next hearing
dates would be July 14 and 15 and that it was assumed that the parties would complete
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the presentation of evidence during those two days.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A"

is page 1982 of the transcript in which the chairman of the panel, Mr. Billings, states:
We've agreed that assuming we finish with all the
testimony at the end of the day on the 15th of July,
the counsel will file their briefs simultaneously. . . is
that agreeable for each side?
Counsel for said Defendants agreed to such statement.
More importantly, said Defendants did not use the full two days to present
its surrebuttal case but terminated its surrebuttal case at approximately twelve noon
on July 15th.

Again, Mr. Billings, the chairman of the panel asked counsel for said

Defendants if they had any further witnesses to which counsel for said Defendants
indicated that they had no more witnesses. See copies of pages 2694-96 of the transcript
attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

Said exhibit shows no objection to concluding the

evidence portion taking of the hearing. Further, no objection was ever made on or off
the record.
C.

THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN

AWARDING INTEREST AT 15 PERCENT PER ANNUM.
The contract between the parties in Article 11.1.4 provides that payments
due but unpaid shall bear interest at the rate the owner is paying on the construction
loan or at the legal rate, whichever is higher.

In support of its position, Plaintiff

submitted Exhibit 28, one page of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Said exhibit
reflects the interest rate requested by Plaintiff which was the rate of the construction
loan (a floating rate of prime plus two percent).

The arbitrators did not start the

running of interest in August 1981 as Plaintiff requested but delayed it until December,
1981.

Rather than awarding interest at the floating rate the arbitrators awarded

interest at the average of the various interest rates from December 1981 to the present
which averages 15.05 percent (rounded it off to fifteen percent).
Plaintiffs submit that it is clearly within the perrogative and power of the
arbitrators to use an average interest rate rather than using the floating interest rate.
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An early Utah case contains language which sheds light on this issue.

The court in

Bivans vs. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Company, 174 P. 1126 (Utah 1918) states:
Speaking generally, it may be said that (arbitration)
awards will not be disturbed on account of irregularities
or informalities, or because the court does not agree
with the award, so long as the proceeding has been fair
and honest and the substantial rights of the parties have
been respected.
The case of Giannopulos vs. Pappas, supra, also states that "ordinarily a
court has no authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to
substitute its conclusions for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the
scope of their authority".
D. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS PROPERLY ENTERED THE AWARD AGAINST
BOTH C & A ENTERPRISES AND C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY.
The construction contract was initially entered into between Plaintiff and
Defendant C & A Development Company.

It was stipulated between the parties that

said contract was subsequently assigned by Defendant C <5c A Development Company
to Defendant C <5c A Enterprises. Said assignment makes both parties liable.

Plaintiff

never specifically withdrew their claim against Defendant C & A Development but
acknowledges that its statement in the reply of Plaintiff of November 4, 1983 is
ambiguous in terms of Plaintiffs not arguing further what had already been argued to
the panel.
Further, and more importantly, the principle heretofore cited that ordinarily
a court has no authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to
substitute its conclusion for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the scope
of their authority is applicable here as well.
II. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS WAS NOT GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN REFUSING
TO PERMIT SAID DEFENDANTS TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR SURREBUTTAL CASE.
As has been outlined heretofore, the purpose of the reopened hearing was
to clarify the assignment of the construction contract between Defendant C & A

- 9 Development and Defendant C & A Enterprises to clarify the proper parties to the
action.

Initially, said Defendants objected to the reopening unless said Defendants

could present further evidence on all issues of the case.

The panel of arbitrators

decided to reopen the hearing to clarify the proper parties.

The necessity of the

clarification arose out of the fact that throughout the seventeen day hearing the
witnesses, the arbitrators, counsel for Plaintiff, and even counsel for Defendants simply
referred to the three C & A entities as "C & ATT without effort to differentiate or
distinguish among the different entities.
More importantly, said Defendants never made any proffer of evidence as
to what evidence said Defendants wanted to present but simply stated that they wanted
to present additional surrebuttal evidence. Section 78-31-16(3) provides that arbitrators
may be guilty of misconduct only in refusing "to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced."

There is absolutely no showing or even an inkling of what it was

that said Defendants wanted to present that they had not presented or had an opportunity
to present during the 17 days of hearing extending over a four month period. Neither
is there the slightest evidence that the excluded evidence was "pertinent and material
to the controversy".

in. THERE WAS NOT EVIDENT PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF THE PANEL OF
ARBITRATORS.
Said Defendants are clearly grasping at straws to argue that this panel was
guilty of "evident partiality".

To support its argument said Defendants simply point

out issues in which the panel ruled against said Defendants. If there had been evident
partiality why didn't the panel of arbitrators award Plaintiff a sum in excess of
$750,000.00 as was requested.
attached hereto as Exhibit "D".

See the summary of damages entered at the hearing

- 10 Said Defendants dispute the panel's interpretation of some contract language.
Said Defendants cite one page of testimony from one witness where in reality ten
witnesses testified regarding that issue and the testimony consisted of hundreds of
pages. Further, said Defendants assert that there was clear evidence that differential
settlement had occurred and caused damage to the building.

There was also clear

evidence presented that what had occurred was not damage to the building but was
nothing out of the ordinary.
Let it simply be said that the arbitrators heard the evidence which was
voluminous and either found that there was no damage or found that Plaintiff was not
liable for the damage.

In either event, the arbitrators are not guilty of "evident

partiality" simply because they found against said Defendants.
IV. THE AWARD WAS NOT PROCURED BY FRAUD OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS.
Said Defendants have gone from grasping at straws to trying to catch the
wind in arguing that the award was procured by fraud or other undue means. There was
a dispute throughout the hearing concerning the scope of work for the subject
construction contract. Several sets of contract drawings were introduced into evidence
and testimony presented regarding variations between the different sets of contract
drawings and the importance of said variations. Nine witnesses testified regarding this
issue.

The issue was briefed by both parties.

The arbitrators apparently found that

the scope of work was as asserted by Plaintiff which included approximately 80 signed
change orders to the contract. Said Defendants argued during the course of the hearing,
in their briefs, and now in their Motion to Vacate Award that Plaintiff committed
fraud upon said Defendants in somehow duping said Defendants in what work was
actually to be performed. The scope of work issue has been fully litigated. The ruling
must stand.

- 11 CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff submits that the award of the panel of
arbitrators be confirmed. The dispute is over two years old, has been through protracted
evidentiary hearings where all parties were provided the opportunity to present all
evidence desired, and a decision has been rendered by an impartial qualified panel of
arbitrators. The parties should be required to abide by the decision of the panel of
arbitrators.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1983.
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITTIG

By: tfUtjt ¥-^JUoL
Robert F. Babcock

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion to Vacate, postage thereon fully prepaid, this

D

January, 1984, to the following:
Robert F. Bentley
Vaughn Armstrong
C & A Companies, Inc.
P. O. Box 1549
Scottsdale, AZ 84252

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Blvd. #10
Ogden, Utah 84401

Michael Glassman
Attorney for Redd Roofing
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P. O. Box 226
Kaysville, Utah 84037

Jeff Willis
Streich, Lang, Weeks <5c Cardon
P. O. Box 471
Phoenix, A7 85001

Joseph Smith Plumbing
483 E. Maryrose Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Wftl^

j

ediu^

day of

Worthington & Kimball.
(Hearing adjourned.)
* * *

(24 i*ly 1983 - 2:00 p.m.)
MR. BILLINGS: We've agreed that assuming we
finish 'with all the testimony at the end of the day en the 15
of July, that counsel will file their briefs simultaneously c
the 15th of August, and they'll serve each other by express
mail.

And at the same time, they'll send copies to each of t

Panel, and that reply briefs will be due on the 25th of Aucus
to be served in the same fashion.

Is that agreeable for each

sice?
MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes.
MR. TANSEY:

On the 15th and on the 25th.

We

will also provide a copy to the AAA.
MR. BILLINGS:

If they want, but we want curs

direct.
MR. TANSEY: Yes.
MR. ARMSTRONG:
MR. LYMAN:

Shall we send them all to you?

You have the addresses.

MR. BILLINGS:

You have our addresses. Why

don't ycu send them separately?
MR. BILLINGS:

Mr. Rollins, you're still under

oath.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

1982
&.K. "A"

THE WITNESS:

That's right.

MR. BETTILYON:
MR. BABCOCK:

Okay.

But for further clarification, the

sample was takan off the east wall which would have the 900
loading, not the 2,500.
THE WITNESS:

No, no.

The sample was taken on

the south* wall.
Let!s not all talk at once.

MR. BILLINGS:
Either have counsel or the —
THE WITNESS:

The test pits were taken,

according to the testimony, on the east side.

The boring, the

last boring made was taken on the south side or the heavy
loaded one.
MR. BABCOCK:
test pits on the east wall.
wall.

I'll clarify that.

There were two

Rollins1 boring was on the east

Rollins took another sample for Chen's third test, which

was taken on the south wall.
MR. BILLINGS:

Anything further with this

witness?
MR. BABCOCK: No.
MR. ARMSTRONG:

No.

MR. BILLINGS:

Thank you, Mr. Anderson.

MR. BILLINGS:

Do you have any further

witnesses?
MR. ARMSTRONG:

No.

2694
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MR. BILLINGS:

Do you have anything further

witnesses, Mr. Babcock?
MR. BABCOCK:

No.

MR. BILLINGS:

Then the evidence portion taking
Itfs my understanding that

of this hearing will be concluded.

counsel agreed they will exchange briefs and furnish therr. to
the arbitrators en the 15th of August and reply briefs ten cays
thereafter, which would be the 25th.
MR. TANSEY:

I think we agreed we would send

each one individually and also send a copy to AAA.
MR. BILLINGS:

If both side agree to do that —

MR. TANSEY: We agreed on the 15th, Federal
Express or whatever, same day.
MR. LYMAN:

The hearing doesn't technically

close until the last brief is received.
MR. TANSEY:

Yes.

Until the close it.

MR. BILLINGS: We close it.

And I was just

going to suggest that we would close it by —

we will have a

session, the three of us, after we've had a chance to review
the briefs, both the open and responsive briefs.
(Off-the-record.)
MR. BILLINGS:

For the record, the Board of

Arbitrators will meet on August 30, 9:30 a.m. here, and
officially close the hearing at that time, unless after
discussion of the briefs, we feel we need seme more help from

2695
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counsel, if that's agreeable.

2

MR. EABCOCK:

3

MR. ARMSTRONG:

4

That's fine.
That's fine.

(Hearing concluded.)
* * *

6
7
3
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
IS
17
13
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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LAST DRAW i:NCLUDING RETAINAGE
INTEREST ON EXCESSIVE RETAINAGE WITHHELD
INTEREST ON LATE PAYMENTS
TOTAL

445,883.00
15,373.00
9,7 34.00
470,990.0 0

ACCRUING INTEREST

DATE

INTEREST
RATE

8-30-31

(22.50)

+

17 4L98

9-30-31

(22.08)

+

8693.26

•

10-3 0-81

(20.45)

+

8204.37

=

11-30-81

(13.84)

+

7687.26

:

43 9,634.61
497,321.87

12-30-81

(17.7 5)

+

7356.21

s

504,678.08

1-30-82

07.75)

+

7465.02

2-29-82

(18.56)

+

7921.14

3-30-82

08.50)

+

8017.65

4-30-82

(18.50)

+

814L25

s

536,223.15

5-30-82

08.50)

+

8266.77

•

544,439.92

6-30-82

(18.50)

+

8394.21

:

552,334.13

7-30-82

(18.26)

+

8413.05

•

551,297.13

8-30-32

(16.3 9)

+

7666.38

558,963.56

9-30-82

(15.50)

+

7349.11

576,312.67

10-30-82

(14.52)

+

6973.38

11-30-32

(13.85)

+

6732.09

590,018.14

12-30-82

(13.50)

+

6637.70

595,655.84

^30-83

03.16)

+

6543.32

603,199.16

2-30-83

(12 J 8)

+

6524.60

3-30-83

(12 J 8)

+

6595.13

618,318.93

4-30-83

(12 .9 8)

+

6666.52

622,935.44

5-30-83

(12.98)

+

6738.62

629,724.06

INTEREST
DUE

BALANCE
PUS
472,7 31.9 3
431,430.24

V

512,143.10
=

520,064.24
528,031.89

•

:

583,286.05

609,723.76

-t O A

SUMMARY OF DAMAGES

Balance of Contract and Retainage

445.SS3.03

Interest on Excessive Retainage Withheld By C k A
Interest On Late Progress Payments

13,373.0 0
9,7 34.03

Interest On Contract Payments To Date

133.734.CO

Delay Damages - - Extended Overhead

133.055.CO

Interference ~ Disruption Damages

50.CC3.00

AdcStionel Tank Line Wall

2.503.03

G r e a t Due C oc A

(23.347.CO)
TOTAL DUE

£*."£'

735.9C2.00
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF y£AH
WEBf.

FILE:

WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership,
GARY WORTHINGTON and EDWIN N.
KIMBALL, General Partners,

lb d W ' b

JAN

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, C & A
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona partnership,
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF ARIZONA,
STEWART TITLE COMPANY, et al.,
Civil No.

83387

Defendants.

Having
argument
their

memoranda

and heard oral

thereon, I find that the arbitrators

did not exceed

powers,

evidence

studied the parties1

that

no

evidence

award

was

of

misconduct

procured

by

or

fraud

Plaintiff's motion to confirm award is granted.

partiality,
or

other

no

means.

Defendants C & A

Development Company and C & A Enterprises motion to vacate the
award is denied.
DATED this

&L day of January, 1984.

Page 2
Memorandum Decision
Case No. 83387

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

\*~ day of January, 1984,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:

Robert F.
Attorneys
185 South
Salt Lake

Babcock
for Plaintiff
State, Suite 1000
City, Utah 84111

Robert F. Bentley
Attorney for Defendant
C & A Companies, Inc.
P. 0. Box 1549
Scottsdale, Arizona 84252
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Blvd. #10
Ogden, Utah 84401
Joseph Smith Plumbing
483 E. Maryrose Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84037

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Buehner
311 South State #380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael J. Glasmann
Attorney for Redd Roffing
1000 First Security Bank
Ogden, Utah 84401
David B. Smith
First Interstate Bank of
Arizona
P. 0. Box 20551
Phoenix, Arizona 85036
Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
Kaysville, Utah 84037

PAULA CARR, Secretary

i
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FILE:-

c' - • — "
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN of
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant,
Otto Buehner & Company
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah general partnership
GARY WORTHINGTON and
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general
partners,

SUMMONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation,
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A.,
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an
Arizona corporation,
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER &
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY,
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY,
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING,
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and
JOHN DOES 1 through 24,
Defendants.

C i v i l No. 83387

-2THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer
in writing to the attached Crossclaim with the clerk of the above
entitled court, and to serve upon, or mail to THOMAS A. DUFFIN,
Cross-Claim Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company's attorney, 311
South State, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, a copy of

said answer within 20 days after service of this Summons upon
you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Crossclaim which has
been filed with the clerk of said court and a copy of which is
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
Dated this 's^

day of ^ V ^ s

, 1983.

SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
/

/ £ ' T- Z c

s

A/X
<-

/

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner & Co,
Serve:
Redd Roofing Company
513 West Lake Street
Ogden, Utah

Recorded ***•+£
:
Page
'~:J}
Indexed •
\' j j
Robert F. ^abcock of
'•
'
^
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITTIG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

jRKfi « » " • -

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership,
et al,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

X

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al,

Civil No. 83387

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award and Defendant's Motion to Vacate Award
came on regularly for hearing on January 6, 1984 at 11:00 a.m. before the Honorable
Ronald O. Hyde.

Robert F. Babcock was present and representing Plaintiffs.

Robert

F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong were present and representing Defendants C & A
Development Company and C & A Enterprises.

LaVar E. Stark was present and

representing Defendant Stewart Title. Thomas A. Duffin was present and representing
Buehner Concrete.

Michael J. Glassman was present and representing Redd Roofing.

The Court having considered the respective motions and having been fully
advised as to the Pleadings, the parties' memoranda and having heard oral argument
thereon,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award is granted and Defendants C & A Development
Company and C & A Enterprises' Motion to Vacate Award is denied.

f.JkA
Indexed

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover judgment against C & A
Development Company, "an Arizona Corporation, and C & A Enterprises, an Arizona
general partnership, with C & A Companies, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Frank S.
Campbell, Robert A. Campbell, F. Richard Campbell, Gary Dee Jones, and Robert F.
Bentley, as general partners, the sum of $377,131.00 plus interest at the rate of fifteen
percent (15%) per annum from December 1, 1981 until paid together with costs as
awarded.
DATED this

^ 3 day of January, 1984.
BY THE-T^URT:

^n&f&iJl*-

i^T-9—-

RonakMX Hyde, District Judi
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment, postage thereon fully prepaid, this

\\

day of January, 1984, to the

following:
Robert F. Bentley
Vaughn Armstrong
C & A Companies, Inc.
P. O. Box 1549
Scottsdale, AZ 84252

Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title
2651 Washington Blvd. #10
Ogden, Utah 84401

Michael Glassman
Attorney for Redd Roofing
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven M. Ashby
Holbrook Company, Inc.
151 North 600 West
P. O. Box 226
Kaysville, Utah 84037

Jeff WiUis
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon
P. O. Box 471
Phoenix, AZ 85001

Joseph Smith Plumbing
483 E. Maryrose Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
&

:VM 'ic/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2)
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL, et al.f

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No.

I

hold

that while

personally

part

of

and

Otto

involved

Buehner
in

83387

& Company

the

were

arbitration

not

dispute

between Kimball Construction and C & A Enterprises, their claim
was.

That the arbitration decision is dispositive of the claims

between Kimball and C & A.
estoppel

is applicable

to

That the doctrine of collateral
the

claim

of

Otto

Beuhner

and

is

binding upon C & A Companies as to the amount due and owing.
The arbitration dispute also settled the responsibility
for any failures or defects in the building resulting from soil
conditions, defferential settlement and the like. The sufficiency
of the footings was determined by the arbitration board not to be
the

responsibility

application

of

of

the

collateral

contractor; therefore,
estoppel

also

found

not

through
to

be

the
the

responsibility of Otto Beuhner.

711
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In other words, the counterclaim of C & A Enterprises
against Otto Beuhner is barred on the basis of the collateral
estoppel doctrine.
As to whether or not Otto Buehner substantially complied
with

the notice

provisions

of mechanic's

liens, the decision

thereon is reserved for trial with the other questions of the
validity of liens.
DATED this

day of November, 1984.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of November, 1984,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Robert F. Bentley
Attorney for C & A Enterprises, Inc.
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Security Title and
First Interstate Bank
2485 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

»*f -J ^-N

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALLf et al.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
vs.

9

C & A DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.f
Case No.

83387

Defendants.

As to the question of the date of final completion of
the prime contract.

I find that the date of the delivery of the

certificate of substantial completion is not the key date.
find

that

the

evidence

shows

that

the

plaintiffs

were

I

doing

continual work in the nature of punch list corrections up to the
date they were requested to leave.

I find that the date of

November 12, when they went in and dug the final trench, was the
date of final completion.

I further find that this work was done

in good faith and not for the purpose of extending the lien date.
The application of final payment was not made until after this
date

which

is

further

evidence

complete the punch list work.

of

good

faith

in

trying

to

I further find that the continual

work on the punch list was not trivial or minor, but was a good
faith attempt to remedy defects as requested by the owner.
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As to the Otto Beuhner lien.

This lien was filed within

64 days following the suspension of the work on the project, and,
therefore, timely filed.
owner

on January

18.

A copy of the lien was mailed to the
It was not mailed

by certified mail;

however, it is agreed that the owners received a copy of the
mechanic's lien a few days following January 18.
requires

that

the

lien

claimant

certified mail a copy of the lien.
this phrasing

shall

Section 38-1-7

deliver

or

mail

by

I hold that the purpose of

is to assure notice, and that where notice was

admittedly received, that the failing to mail by certified mail
is of no legal significance.

Regular mail would

satisfy the

deliver requirement.
The question of proper verification is not raised on the
Beuhner lien.

In regard to the Beuhner lien, I hold that it is

valid and enforceable.

If my figures are correct, the amount

owed is $41,466 with interest since December 1, 1981.

In this

regard, I hold the interest to be the legal rate and not the 15%
awarded by the arbitration board.
used as a form of penalty.
enforcement

The 15% figure was apparently

In regard to attorney's fees for the

of this lien, I find the amount of $12,000 to be

reasonable.
As to Smith Plumbing, they filed a counterclaim against
Worthington & Kimball, but did not bring an action for the foreclosure of its lien.

I find that the amount owed Smith Plumbing

is $6,172.50 with interest at 10% from December 1, 1981.

*-age 3
Memorandum Decision
Case No. 83387
I find the amount owed Worthington & Kimball is $377,131
less

$2f355

that goes to personal property and not under the

lien.
As

to

Worthington

the

first

& Kimball,

and

it

second

appears

mechanic's

to

me

that

liens
the

of

second

mechanic's lien is nothing more than a correction of the description set forth in the first, and was probably superfluous in that
the

first

mechanic's

lien

sufficient to give notice.

description,

though

flawed,

was

The problem with the plaintiffs' lien

or liens is that they are not verified.

Each is an acknowledg-

ment that the signer executed the notice, and that the contents
thereof is true of his own knowledge.
tion.

This is not a verifica-

A verbal affirmation that the statements are true is not

the same as or a substitute for a verification.

Verification

requires both the swearing to the truth of the statements by the
subscriber and certification thereto by the officer authorized by
law to administer oaths.
be

verified".

Mortgage

v.

It

appears

Hansen

verification.

Section 38-1-7 states "the claim must

That

that

forecloses
case

the
a

states

hypertechnicality that we can discount.
Lien is created.

case

of

First

substitution
"verification

for
is

Security
actual
not

a

Without verification, no

Our statute leaves no room for doubt as to the

requirement of a verified notice of claim, and this court, in
Eccles Lumber Company v. Martin stated that since a mechanic's
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lien is statutory and not contractualf a lien cannot be acquired
unless the claimant complies with the statutory provision."

The

Court further stated that "where the statute fails, courts cannot
create

rights, and

should

not do so by unnatural and forced

construction."
Plaintiffs' notice of lienf lacking verificationf

fails

to create a valid mechanic's lien.
^tto Beuhner is entitled to judgment against Worthington
& Kimball for the figure set out above, as is Smith Plumbing.
Otto Beuhner is entitled to a decree of foreclosure in the amount
as set out above plus attorney's fees.
fees

to

the

prevailing

party,

in

In regard to attorney's

regard

to

the

failure

to

Worthington & Kimball's lien, I find C & A's attorney's fees to
be reasonably worth $6,000, and the Defendants First Interstate
Bank of Arizona and Stewart Title together to be worth $6,000.
The reason these fees are less than Beuhner's attorney's fees is
because they prevail in part and do not prevail in part.
Counsel

for

Otto

Beuhner

and

Company

is to

prepare

findings, conclusion and judgment in accordance herewith.
DATED this

/D

day of January, 1985.

RC(NALD 0. HYDE/ Judde
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this \[

day of January, 1985,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Robert F. Bentley
Attorney for C & A Enterprises, Inc.
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Security Title and
First Interstate Bank
2485 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Plaintiffs
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Defendant Otto Beuhner
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111

r,
2^x—^-

'

^*Zx-\x«*

PAULA CARRf Secretary
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